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The United States has always claimed to be endowed with unique values, such 
as tolerance and justice, and so throughout its history has sought to convey these 
values with expressions of patriotism. However, is this patriotism simply symbolic, and 
further, does it even lead itself to xenophobia and racism. This thesis seeks to answer 
this question by examining the genesis and development of patriotism throughout the 
country’s history, as well as the way in which its racism and xenophobia have changed. 
Beginning with a general examination of the usefulness and positivity of patriotism from 
a scholarly standpoint, the basic points regarding the controversial issue are laid out. 
The main ideas of this dispute are provided by noted scholars George Kateb and John 
Kleinig in their works Patriotism and Other Mistakes and The Ethics of Patriotism: A 
Debate, respectively. Next, using research on history of the United States beginning 
from the Revolution, and ending with the Vietnam Era, an extensive picture of these 
issues in America develops. This then provides good comparison to the main discussion 
of this thesis; the change in patriotism and islamophobia following September 11th, and 
how they are connected. This will mainly revolve around the changing relationship that 
America had with its Arab and Muslim citizens, as well its changing relationship with the 
world. (The former is in many ways a result of the latter). In this more recent era, more 
primary sources are to be used, such as One America in the 21st Century: The 
President's Initiative on Race, as well as Newspaper articles. The positions of Patriotism 
and Islamophobia following soon after 2001 will be the peak of the research and 
discussion, as further than this is arguably too recent to garner useful research.
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Throughout this thesis, the various issues with patriotism are explored, as well as 
its possibility for usefulness. What is meant to be shown throughout is that patriotism 
can and has been used to uphold the positive values of the country, but only when it is 
iconoclastic and willing to be admitted as false. When patriotism has been used 
symbolically and nationalistically, it has been the cause of extreme racism and 
xenophobia, especially in times of crisis such as during World War Two and after 
September 11th. In fact, patriotism has been a self fulfilling idea, as it seeks to protect 
itself by weeding out dissent. What this all shows is that patriotism is a hard term to get 
a clear definition of, but its form in the first decade of the 21st century was very 
damaging. It must be made to resemble a purer form of loyalty to the ideal rather than 
the symbol to ever be practical again.
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Chapter One:
When discussing patriotism, an important question arises: What exactly is it? 
This question has been debated over and again, but patriotism has generally been 
described as a loyalty to a land, democratic constitution, history, and cultural identity. 
This does not exclusively entail nation states either, as theoretically, patriotism can be to 
any territorial social order, from a polis, to a multinational body such as the European 
Union.  This definition is partly what distinguishes patriotism from nationalism. Instead 1
of a loyalty to a specific ethnic or cultural group, a patriot is loyal to a democratic system 
as well as that system’s history. This is where the term patriotism is derived; a devotion 
to the patria (fatherland) rather than the ethno-state.  The loyalties demanded from 2
patriotism are also widely debated, but generally entail defending the ideals which the 
country provides, and further endeavoring to mend the nation rather than expatriating to 
another country when it begins to falter in any way. It is important to note how none of 
this necessarily entails a passionate love of the country, only a stout resolution to 
endeavor for its betterment.  Additionally, it should be further said that a political system 3
has forfeited its right to a patriotic citizenry when it delves into tyranny. This 
interpretation of patriotism is also quite close to the widely accepted idea of ‘civic 
nationalism’ with some even considering the two to be synonymous.  Additionally, many 4
definitions of patriotism also describe a transition to a more cosmopolitan, or globalist, 
 John Kleinig, Simon Keller, and Igor Primoratz. The Ethics of Patriotism: A Debate. Malden, 1
MA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015, 29.
 Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. The Ethics of Patriotism. 20.2
 Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. The Ethics of Patriotism. 20.3
 Encyclopedia of Nationalism: Leaders, Movements, and Concepts. Vol. 2. San Diego, CA: 4
Academic Press, 2001. 407.
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view over time. The ideas described have been largely accepted as the theoretical 
example of a perfect patriotism, and clearly distinguish it from nationalism. However, 
there are other important factors which define it. In additional to the quasi-Social 
Contract aspects of Patriotism, which exist between the citizenry and the state, are 
aspects that most scholars consider to be inevitabilities. In the mind of some scholars, 
patriotism even becomes an end in and of itself as a byproduct of human nature and 
sociability.  Whether for or against patriotism, most academic research agrees upon the 5
social certainty of the grouping of peoples into political entities and feeling loyalty 
therein. What is not inevitable is the type of grouping which will be formed; a democracy 
based on pluralism or an ethno-state. (While ethnic states are not inherently 
undemocratic, the nation-states which depended on nationalism in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries stand in stark contrast to the democratic multiethnic states which 
claim to demand patriotism in the twentieth and twenty-first century).  Additionally, while 6
many agree on the inevitability of patriotism, they do not agree that it is a positive.
In his scathing but principled castigation of patriotism entitled Patriotism and 
Other Mistakes, the political scholar George Kateb describes the various dilemmas 
caused by said political loyalty. Start with the simple idea that despite its inevitability, 
Kateb argues that intelligent people should know better than to espouse patriotism.  He 7
then goes on to describe the varied concerns of, and issues caused by it. Firstly, he 
describes the sad loss of personal identity of those who involve themselves in patriotic 
 Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. The Ethics of Patriotism. 22-23.5
 Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. The Ethics of Patriotism. 296
 Kateb, George. Patriotism and Other Mistakes. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006. 7
3.
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sentiments. In Kateb’s mind, patriotism, like religion and other forms of group thought, is 
a simple form of idolatry. He even describes patriotism as arguably being its worst form. 
By embracing group love, Kateb argues, we lose all individual identity. He goes on to 
say that this form of collective identity is as harmful as being overly self-serving, but that 
selfishness at least comes with a shame which prevents one from become too 
narcissistic. In his mind, this is a trait which patriotism generally does not have.  On the 8
other side, some scholars have come to defend patriotism, tentatively, such as John 
Kleinig. Regarding the idea of patriotism as a form of idolatry or narcissistic group-love, 
Kleinig argues that we, as humans, are naturally inclined to become overly self-
centered. Because of this, while humans occasionally are unthinking in loyalty, a healthy 
loyalty to the place which created us and our identity can in fact be a virtue. The key 
caveat here is the term ‘healthy’, as Kleing makes clear that patriots need to remain 
cautious as it is often a pitfall of loyalty to blindly praise some false and sterile heroism. 
In avoiding this, understanding the bygone, and affirming the liberties entailed in a 
democracy, people can engage in a more “mature” construct of patriotism.  However, 9
Kateb would likely disagree with this, as to him, the sanitization of history is simply a 
natural and unavoidable aspect of all national loyalty.
In Kateb’s opinion, a country is an abstract entity consisting of only borders and 
transmitted memories. Moreover, these memories are often cleansed and purified to fit 
a country’s idea of identity. This is in large part the second issue Kateb has with 
patriotism; the comfortably clean collective memory. Arguably even more cynical (or 
 Kateb. Patriotism and Other Mistakes. 15-16. 8
 Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. The Ethics of Patriotism. 39.9
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realistic, depending on one’s position) than the idea of a sanitized history is the 
argument that the shared memory a nation claims to be commemorating is not even 
really its own. Considering that most persons in a country like the United States are not 
completely native to it, they should not seek to claim identity with it in this fashion. In this 
way, the nation fits in with Kateb’s idea of an abstraction not deserving of loyalty.  10
However, the idea of a sanitized history is in direct conflict with Kleinig’s idea of a 
‘mature’ patriotism, given that understanding a country’s past and one’s place in it is 
vital to representing and fostering a nation’s future. Additionally, Kleinig would likely 
further argue that a country is much less of an abstraction than Kateb believes. 
Countries can equally be characterized by landmarks, peoples, and laws, as well as its 
borders and collective memories. Given all this, is patriotism a blind chauvinism and 
vanity? Kleinig argues not, but rather, that pride in a national character absent of ‘we’re 
better than you’ narcissism is acceptable and even laudable. Additionally, the universal 
values upheld by the nation are nothing to be ashamed of, and keeping them in mind 
and memory can even be indispensable.  However, Kateb would argue that in addition 11
to being conceited, patriotism can also be immoral and dangerous.
Kateb begins this argument regarding the nefariousness of patriotism by 
discussing its effects, but in doing so, he does concedes that it can in fact be used for 
good. Applying the example of Abraham Lincoln using patriotic sentiments to rally the 
people to defend the nation and end slavery, he says that patriotism can have an 
instrumental virtue. However, his caveat to this is that this is all patriotism can be; an 
 Kateb. Patriotism and Other Mistakes. 7-8.10
 Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. The Ethics of Patriotism. 37-38.11
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instrument. This means that it is not, and can not be, a good in and of itself. Additionally, 
Kateb argues that, more often than not, it is used for much more immoral purposes. In 
essence, this implies that fighting for ones country may or may not be moral, but will 
always be patriotic.  Additionally, regarding fighting for countries which happen to be 12
democratic, he says that a willingness to fight for a democratic country is not the same 
as fighting for the principal itself.  On the other hand, Kleinig would argue that, in 13
actuality, the cooperation which patriotism creates is the only reason a democratic 
country can flourish and remain so constitutional. In this way, while patriotism can be 
used in a corrupting fashion, it is also vital in upholding a country’s positive virtues. 
However, he does clarify this with the qualifier that patriotism can be bastardized when 
people demonize dissent and claim it is ‘us verses them’.  Both scholars also discuss 14
the main contention of this paper: The alleged inherent jealousy and mistrust which 
patriotism sows in citizens regarding persons both internal and abroad. 
According to Kateb, patriotism is by its nature an envious form of loyalty, the crux 
of his argument essentially being that an ideal patriot desires less patriotism in other 
countries. Even in the case of democracies, which many claim to naturally want to work 
harmoniously, he believes one nation will seek to prey on another. Additionally, he 
argues that democracies often keep domestic liberty at the cost of tyranny abroad, and 
demanding patriotism in such a system is both hypocritical and exploitative.  The 15
example which comes to mind would be American proclamations of liberty, while using 
 Kateb. Patriotism and Other Mistakes. 12-13.12
 Kateb. Patriotism and Other Mistakes. 8.13
 Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. The Ethics of Patriotism. 39-40.14
 Kateb. Patriotism and Other Mistakes. 15.15
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products made in sweatshops overseas. He goes on to compare group love of 
patriotism to self interest again, saying that both enable immorality, but that the former 
was clearly an evil. Kateb’s rationale here is that self-attentiveness and care for close 
friends does not demand the same enmity that group-narcissisms like patriotism do.  16
Imbedded in this inherent antipathy is an aversion or even hostility to others. This type 
of sentiment is not only held by Kateb, as other, more neutral descriptions on patriotism 
admit the implied priority of citizens of the nation over non-citizens and foreigners 
abroad.  However, Kleinig would likely counter this with a very simple but quite 17
effective argument. All of the characteristics described are hallmarks of nationalism 
rather than patriotism. In his mind, true democratic loyalty allows for, and accepts the 
inevitability of, patriots abroad. In this way, patriotism in the mind of Kleinig is a 
perceptive and sympathetic loyalty, while nationalism is the allegiance which declares 
only itself to be legitimate.  Arguably the final issue which Kateb finds with patriotism is 18
also regarding the enmity inspired by patriotism, only now directed towards the mistrust 
it fosters domestically.
For Kateb, as well is being an inherently jealous vice, patriotism is also 
distrusting and paranoid. He describes this by discussing the divide which patriotism 
fosters in society. This entails the distain for those members of society who do not show 
the same levels of flag-waving loyalty. This also means that in order for patriotism to 
function, it demands the obedience of all in the society.  A byproduct of this is the 19
 Kateb. Patriotism and Other Mistakes. 9.16
 Encyclopedia of Nationalism. 407.17
 Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. The Ethics of Patriotism. 41.18
 Kateb. Patriotism and Other Mistakes. 12.19
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perpetual need for enemies to root out. This necessity, along with the suspicion of other 
nations described previously, are largely the basis upon which people criticize patriotism 
and its xenophobic tendencies. However, as with almost all other issues brought up 
regarding patriotism, Kleinig has a cautious confidence in and defense of the virtues of 
patriotism. Regarding the societal apprehensions caused, he would likely counter with 
the idea that theoretically perfect patriotism is not inherently xenophobic, but rather it 
fosters genuine conversations about society. His reasoning would be that a perfect 
patriot should in fact endeavor to improve his or her nation through protest and 
dialogue.  The ‘egoism and elitism' over those viewed to be ‘unpatriotic’ which Kateb 20
alleges is unpatriotic itself, even if done by the citizen who waves his flag the most 
earnestly. A very simplistic but cogent way to think about this is a topic should be kept in 
mind for now. If a person protesting The Vietnam War burned the American flag and 
was subsequently called a traitor by his congressman, who is the true patriot? Kateb 
would likely argue that it is the congressman, as he is suspicious of the dissent and 
wants to root it out, therein lying the malice of patriotism. Kleinig would respond that as 
long as his or her intentions were the earnest betterment of America and her actions, 
the protestor was. This type of question will become increasingly important when 
directly discussing the connection between patriotism and xenophobia more in depth.
From all of these arguments for and against patriotism by scholars, there are few 
prominent points. In a wonderfully apropos analogy made by Kateb, he equated the 
conspicuous patriotism which people express to being a fan of a sports team. While the 
fan can and will actively cheer the team and delight when it does well, a precious few 
 Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. The Ethics of Patriotism. 39.20
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are actually part of the team and and benefit from its success. In this way, in cheering 
for the team and validating it, the fan is engaging in “willful self-exploitation.  Kleing 21
would likely call this argument cynical, as patriots are, in his mind, very connected to the 
actions of the society. More than this, however, he is of the opinion that countries need 
something to bind the country together. For this glue to remain benign and not 
nationalistic or jingoistic, all citizens must engage in positive, remedial patriotism to the 
democratic system.  This means that blind, flag-waving patriotism without any 22
connection to ‘liberty and justice for all’ is in fact fraudulent loyalty to a more nationalistic 
sentiment. While Kateb would likely call this a naive view, many tend to agree with it. It 
is in pursuance of addressing this view that the remainder of this work shall be 
dedicated. To this, a preliminary discussion of American patriotism is required, starting 
from the very dawn of the United States.
The immediate aftermath of the American Revolution was obviously a very 
formative time in the history of the United States, because the actions and celebrations 
of the victory would be the genesis of patriotism in the country. The first question to be 
asked was; How to appreciate the victory and who could engage in the celebrations? 
Almost immediately, as it often is today, liberty and the pulpit were connected. There 
was almost instantaneously an evocation of the connection to the church and the new 
nation, and nowhere was this more exhorted than in the church itself. In associating 
Christianity and Republicanism, priests and ministers were in fact strengthening the 
 Kateb. Patriotism and Other Mistakes. 18.21
 Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. The Ethics of Patriotism. 27-28.22
 13
power and legitimacy of the government.  Also ingrained in post revolution patriotism, 23
and again similar to today, was the virtue of military gratitude. In the minds of many 
citizens, the gratitude towards those who freed the nation from the yoke of British 
tyranny was the type of kindred patriotism that would hold the new states together. By 
extension, ingratitude would tear them apart. While on the outset this seems quite 
reasonable and even positive, like today, ingratitude or callousness would be seen as 
disloyalty.  Indeed, it can even be alleged that this type of loyalty testing was an effort 24
by the new states to rout out disloyal citizens, whether intentionally or simply a 
serendipitous result. (This will be discussed more later in reference to the loyalist 
integration issue). While this is the form it took, patriotism still largely remained an 
apparatus of the government. 
Strikingly similar to today, patriotism was not just a loyalty in and of itself in the 
post-revolution era, but was a device by which people were swayed. Just like many 
politicians today use patriotism as flagpole issue they are defending in order to gain 
popular support, political figures at the time also used it to further their ideals. Every 
political argument, from slavery, federalism verses republicanism, to foreign policy vis-a-
vis the British, had an air of patriotism. Moreover, patriotism was allegedly directly used 
by the affluent to command additional control over the citizenry as well. In creating 
usable monuments and rallying points, the elites united the people under them and the 
 Sarah J. Purcell. Sealed with Blood: War, Sacrifice, and Memory in Revolutionary America. 23
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2002. 50. 
 Purcell. Sealed with Blood. 67.24
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country they controlled.  It was largely because of all this patriotic sentiment created 25
around the new country that the Loyalist reintegration issue became so contentious. 
One of the more important issues in post-Revolution America, which is often 
overlooked in favor of more ‘federalism verses republicanism’ discussions, was the 
issue of whether or not to reintegrate those who had remained loyal to the British. The 
main reason why new citizens of the United States mistrusted loyalists was because 
they fought against everything the new patriotism was formed around. Considering that 
post war loyalty to the United States was largely based around gratitude for the people 
who ensure the independence of the colonies, how could someone who actively fought 
against that independence possibly be patriotic or loyal?  The substantive goals of 26
these loyalists did not matter, by dint of being loyalists, they could not be complete 
citizens of this new society. This meant former neighbors would forever be treated with 
skepticism and mistrust. This issue illustrates the main issue being discussed in the 
essay. While not precisely xenophobia, this apprehension of loyalists shows the 
inherent mistrust ingrained in patriotism. Also important in the critiques of patriotism is 
the allegation that patriots are not truly loyal to the ideals which they claim to be. The 
argument revolving around the revolution, and again one which is familiar today, is the 
mistreatment of veterans. For a society which claimed to be celebrating and revering 
those who fought and died fighting for liberty, they were not treated as such. This is 
largely the reason why, only a few years after the revolution, Daniel Shays, a veteran, 
 Purcell. Sealed with Blood. 64-66.25
 Purcell. Sealed with Blood. 68.26
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revolted against the society he believed had slighted him.  This is thus indicative of 27
another possible problem of patriotism; that it is blind and even a boldfaced lie whose 
virtuous facets are hardly ever lived up to. Despite all these issues surrounding it, one of 
main sources of patriotic symbolism today is the era of Revolution. The next major 
examination of patriotism occurred around 80 years later, during the American Civil War. 
The American Civil War saw the rise in what one commenter called “one of the 
first ideological armies in history.”  The reason for this description is that, unlike armed 28
forces before and after them, both the Union and Confederate forces seemed to know 
and believed what they were fighting for. In well published accounts of modern wars, 
patriotism has not been a very compelling factor for the fighting men of the United 
States. On the other hand, modern research shows that those fighting in the Civil War 
carried a patriotic loyalty with them, and which they wore proudly.  Essentially, the 29
Yankees were generally fighting to save the republic (except black soldiers fighting for 
emancipation), while the Rebs were fighting for independence from a tyrannical rule, 
mainly exemplified in the infringing on the right to keep slaves. The pride of the Yankees 
is admittedly harder to pin down than the Rebels, as they were generally not fighting for 
their homes like their enemies were. Additionally, their commitment to ending slavery 
was not as strong as the southerner’s commitment to keeping it. What has become 
clearer through research is that the soldiers were generally committed to the patriotic 
sentiment of preserving their country. To many, a peace with the South which saw the 
 Purcell. Sealed with Blood. 73-74.27
 James M. McPhereson. "On the Altar of My Country." In The Civil War Soldier: A Historical 28
Reader, edited by Michael Barton and Larry M. Logue. New York, NY: NYU Press, 2002. 459. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt9qgfhv.29.pdf.
 McPhereson. "On the Altar of My Country.” 456-45829
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country split in half would be an “inglorious and shameful” peace.  This patriotism was 30
often even exemplified by the Union Soldiers in the more Kleinig-esque form of a 
commitment to liberty, with soldiers holding debates with each other and actively 
reading the papers to stay up to date on their country and her wellbeing. While this type 
of patriotic belief was more often held by the wealthier officers in the army, the general 
commitment to saving the republic was arguably more widespread in the Union army 
than the commitment to keeping slavery was in the Confederate.  This is not to say that 31
the South did not secede and go to war with the expressed goal of keeping their slaves, 
as some contemporaries claimed, only that the patriotism and intentions of common 
Confederate soldiers was not as cut and dry as those of their slave-owning officers.
The patriotism of the Confederate soldiers is arguably more interesting to explore 
than that of the Union due to how fast it cropped up and the different levels which 
soldiers seemed to have. While southerners have always claimed uniqueness from the 
rest of the country, the patriotism required during war time had to be drummed up very 
quickly. Largely based around militarism, the Confederate States portrayed a war to 
escape Yankee tyranny, where it was the South’s God-given mission to save their way 
of life. It was also clear that, like during the Revolution, the South’s patriotism was sold 
at the pulpit.  However, it was largely when the Northern armies came to enter 32
Southern territory that the patriotism of soldiers skyrocketed. Now it truly seemed to 
them like a ‘war of Northern Aggression’. In addition to this, however, the war was now 
 McPhereson. "On the Altar of My Country." In The Civil War Soldier. 462-464.30
 McPhereson. "On the Altar of My Country." In The Civil War Soldier. 466.31
 Encyclopedia of Nationalism. 98.32
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about protecting their homes. An interesting development of this sentiment was that 
many Southern soldiers became disillusioned with their new government when they did 
not adequately protect their homes. In fact, this was a large reason for the Confederate 
Government to launch the Tennessee Campaign.  However, this is not to say that no 33
soldiers believed in the cause, as many did truly surmise that the ‘destiny of the south’ 
and the causes it represented was worth dying for. Additionally, even more so than in 
the North, this sentiment was more prevalent in the officers. While the common soldier 
wanted to defend his family, the slave owning officer was much more committed to 
fighting to the death, even if it meant never seeing his family again. The connection 
between true Confederate patriotism and slave holding is of course strong, as slave 
holding rebels were around twice as likely to wholeheartedly support the war.  To be 34
clear, racism and a dependence on the status-quo was obviously a factor in the 
patriotism of the common Confederate soldier, but to say it was the only factor in his 
mind is simply naive. Clearly the motivations and patriotism of non-slaveholding 
Confederate soldiers were often quite complicated, with aspects of racism, dependence 
on the subjugation and second class status of blacks, Dixie pride, and defense of the 
homestead all being factors in their loyalty. However, some claimed it to be so 
complicated, with none of the racist leanings being present. Given the rise in 
Confederate symbolism and monuments around 1900, many had the public believe that 
 McPhereson. "On the Altar of My Country." In The Civil War Soldier. 462.33
 McPhereson. "On the Altar of My Country." In The Civil War Soldier. 466.34
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the war was only about individual and states rights.  Regardless, the Civil War also had 35
very profound effects on patriotism of the post-war north as well.
As with the Revolution, the immediate post Civil War era was marked by a 
celebration and commemoration for those who had died. As early as 1866 a civic 
religion was being formed around the martyrs of Abraham Lincoln and the glorious 
Union dead. However, this is not to say that these were the only people credited with 
the victory. While the celebrations were largely based around military glory and the 
triumph of the Republic over those who would divide it, everybody celebrated their own 
role. Whether black or white, man or woman, immigrant or native, the people of the 
north celebrated their role in the victory.  However, the celebrations were quickly 36
becoming more and more divided. As with dispelling the idea that every northerner was 
staunchly anti-Slavery, it is also important to make clear that they were not all 
desegregationist either. While obviously more so than in the south, the post war 
celebrations show how divided the north was as well. While there were some integrated 
festivities in the post war-north, many remained segregated. Generally, these 
celebrations were also divided on the lines of levity. The integrated celebrations were 
generally coordinated by white organizers and contained pomp and frivolity, with the 
red, white, and blue being prominent. On the other hand, African-American celebrations 
often contained ceremonies and reverence of the Republic and freedom, with more of 
air of respect and solemnity for what had been gained.  This is hardly that surprising, 37
 Encyclopedia of Nationalism. 99.35
 Earl F. Mulderink. “‘On the Altar of my Country’: Contested Commemorations of the Civil War.” 36
In New Bedford’s Civil War, 201-218. Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press, 2012. 204-205. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt13x08tv.15.pdf.
 Mulderink. “On the Altar of my Country” in New Bedford’s Civil War. 205.37
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since blacks had gained arguably the most important and fundamental right of humanity, 
while whites had simply retained what they already had. This is not to say that 
preserving the republic was not a vital and illustrious goal, only that black Americans 
had the heartfelt celebration of freedom as well. However, while black veterans were 
initially treated with the respect they deserved, as the years went by, a greater and 
greater divide emerged between the memories of the war in the minds of blacks and 
whites.
The commemoration of the war was a very important place from which blacks 
could show both their commitment to, and how they fought for, the liberty of the Union. 
African-Americans intended to show the country that they fought and died for the 
republic the same as whites, and were thus committed to keeping the freedom that had 
been won.  This commemoration was perhaps best exemplified in the veterans 38
organizations which cropped up after the war, none of which were as prominent as the 
Grand Army of the Republic (GAR). However, even this organization of brotherhood 
showed the cracks between white and black commemoration of the war. While 
ostensibly interracial and loyal to the constitution and freedoms granted therein (at least 
until the 1870s), the GAR remained de facto segregated in many places. Even worse 
than this is the fact that when black only lodges began cropping up, they received a 
fraction of the benefits and support of their white counterparts, with many failing.  While 39
stories of brotherhood and respect between white and black GAR members remained, 
this substantive and effectual segregation showed the deepening divide between white 
 Mulderink. “On the Altar of my Country” in New Bedford’s Civil War. 212.38
 Mulderink. “On the Altar of my Country” in New Bedford’s Civil War. 210.39
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and black patriotism and commemorations of the war. The disrespect to black veterans 
was even worse. Veterans such as William Carey, first African-American Medal of Honor 
recipient, had to keep reminding the people of the United States of what they had fought 
for. Unlike many whites, black soldiers were fighting primary for equality. Even when 
monuments to black soldiers were erected, such as the ‘Robert Gould Shaw 
Monument’, they were 30 years too late and featured a white man most prominently.  40
The divide in white and black post civil war patriotism only worsened over time, and by 
1900 the Civil War was about largely about Republican reconciliation in the minds of 
white Americans, and not slavery. By this time, another test of American patriotism was 
about to begin. 
Prior to the First World War, German Americans in the Midwest enjoyed a large 
amount of security in celebrating their heritage. Germans were well established in 
communities, and they were highly engaged in the community, owning businesses and 
churches. Their white, Christian values seemingly meshed well with other Americans, as 
the hit ‘German Days’ festivals prove. In McLean County, Illinois, said celebration was 
enjoyed by both Germans and non-Germans alike, with the colors of the fatherland 
adorning flags and buntings across the area.  While this would change, the coming 41
resentment of Germans in the Midwest was not immediate. In fact, following the break 
out of war in Europe, some local German-American newspapers still had free reign to 
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criticize the British leaning consensus of national papers.  However, when America 42
entered the War in 1917, this began to change. With America now firmly on the side of 
the Entente Powers, the government had free reign to engage in wholehearted patriotic 
propaganda. Now America was charged with ‘100 Percent Americanism’, which was 
quickly followed by suspicion of German-Americans and legislation. Arguably the most 
aggressively anti-dissidence law enacted was the Sedition Act of 1918, which helped to 
quell arguments against the war.   With this governmental pressure, the people of the 43
midwest quickly began engaging in aggressive patriotism, while at the same time being 
fed images and stories of the Rape of Belgium and other German barbarity. Because of 
this, midwestern Americans began engaging in ‘patriotic’ flag ceremonies and 
xenophobic book burnings.  Former neighbors were treated with aggressive suspicion, 44
such as a demand for church services and newspapers to be in English. The patriotic 
sounding rationale here was sadly familiar, with proclamations that ‘the Constitution is in 
English, so should your papers’  sounding like it could either be from 1917 or 2017. 45
Threats of violence and arson against Churches followed suit, with precious little 
condemnation from the government. This virulent anti-foreign, and specifically anti-
German sentiment, insidious in and of itself, then fed into the post-war witch hunting of 
the First Red Scare.
America during and following the First World was beginning to reassess what 
freedom of speech meant. Perhaps, in the minds of some, unfiltered free speech was 
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not exactly what the founders had intended, and loyalty may be a more important virtue 
to uphold. Because of this reassessment, aliens and the lower class largely became 
equated with radicals in the emergence of middle-class anxiety induced nativism.  The 46
reason for this emergence was a mix of residual distrust of foreign sabotage from the 
War and the new fear of Bolshevism in the United States. Using new tactics and tools 
such as the Espionage Act, the government could now freely attack what it believed to 
be disloyal elements of the country, the main targets being labor and aliens. Moreover, 
these two groups were not attacked independently. This ‘defense of American Liberty’ 
ironically allowed for such gross attacks on that same liberty, such as the Palmer Raids. 
Ironically, Alexander Palmer actually started as a champion of the underdog. What 
pushed him to violate the rights of so many Americans was predominantly a recognition 
of the fears of the public and that they could be manipulated. By attaching himself to the 
patriotically wary sentiments of the common American and then further fanning the 
public’s xenophobia, Palmer believed he could win the presidency.  The main 47
conclusion regarding patriotism and xenophobia to be drawn from both the First World 
War and the First Red Scare are quite simple, if a bit disheartening. During crises, there 
are no real guarantees against government infringement of liberties unless resisted by 
the people. This means that, essentially, the burden of guilt is partially on the citizens 
when liberties are taken away, because ignoring xenophobic and nationalistic sentiment 
is a crime of inaction. Second, and connected with the first, if the citizen is not careful, 
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the natural patriotism which emerges during wartime can quickly develop itself into a 
tool to take the very liberties it claims to protect.  It appears that, even if there was 48
pushback against the First Red Scare, the American People did not learn their lesson, 
as the fundamental liberties of countless Americans were again stolen during the 
Second World War.
The internment of Japanese Americans was probably the most blatant 
infringement of American Liberties in history. What is interesting about the internment, 
however, is that it was not actually a very popular option immediately following Pearl 
Harbor. The normally unrestrained J. Edgar Hoover found that the link between 
Japanese-Americans and terrorism was limited, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was quick to 
say that these people were more at risk of white-Americans than the other way around, 
military leaders such as John DeWitt expressed their skepticism, and Congress was 
quite restrained in attempting to pass restrictive legislation.  What began to change the 49
opinions of the government was heavy lobbying by anti-Japanese Groups such as the 
‘West Coast Coalition’ (WCC). The WCC was a flagrantly racist organization, often 
advocating for keeping the Japanese out even after the war ended. The only thing the 
war changed with regard to the WCC and their policies was that they had free reign to 
express their views. Now, it was patriotic to try to protect the country from the 
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Japanese.  It was largely because of this lobbying that the government and military 50
made the switch to supporting internment.
When Executive Order 9066 was enacted, it was ostensibly race neural, with 
Italians and Germans as possible targets, as well as the Japanese. However, the order 
quickly came to affect the Japanese solely, mainly because there was little support for 
the internment of the other two ethnic groups. The main reason for this was that the 
Italians and Germans were already assimilated and were not perceived to pose a 
threat.  However, this is not true. Firstly, even though the Germans and Italians were in 51
some ways more assimilated, this did not mean they posed a lesser threat than the 
Japanese. In reality, no group posed a threat to America, but only the Japanese were 
weak enough in the United States that they could be bullied. Second, the threat of 
invasion from the Atlantic was in fact more possible than the Pacific, with actual fighting 
on and off the east coast much more possible.  While in some ways internment seems 52
to resemble other crisis era actions, it should be noted that, despite what some 
revisionist historians claim, internment was not a natural extension of prewar 
suspicions. Rather, people with ulterior motives used an air of patriotism to exploit the 
crisis of World War Two to enact their racist policies.  (Whether this happens in other 53
times such as today will be explored in subsequent chapters). During the next era in 
which American Patriotism was questioned, the Civil Rights Movement, the exploitation 
of crisis largely did not work and the movement was successful.
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Despite what many people of the time alleged, the Civil Rights Movement was 
arguably one of the most patriotic crusade’s in American History. In arguably his most 
famous speech, where he describes his dream for America, Martin Luther King Jr. 
evokes countless patriotic conceptions and symbolism. He goes on to describe the 
promise of the Revolution and the Civil War and the liberties therein.  His evocation of 54
the founding fathers begs the question: Even if the founding fathers did not, are 
Americans patriotic enough to live up to the Constitutional principals of liberty, justice, 
and freedom?  Exactly opposite to the positive idea of patriotism evoked by MLK, 55
whites across the country believed the ideals of America and the founding fathers to be 
on the side of segregation. In an incredibly sad but poignant example of this, at the 
funeral of sometimes overlooked Civil Rights leader Medgar Evers, police officers took 
the American flags away from black mourners.  In a much more political fashion than 56
this type of heartbreaking racism, many also questioned the loyalty of black leaders vis-
a-vis communism. The patriotism and loyalty of civil rights leaders was often challenged, 
with some going so far as to claim that their boldness showed that they were agents of 
the Soviet Union. Said civil rights leadership responded in arguably the most patriotic 
way; by stating that to win the Cold War and defend liberty, America must end 
segregation.  Many soon began to view the Civil Rights Leadership as new founding 57
fathers, which begs an important question in pursuant to the previous one: If civil rights 
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leaders follow the words and ideals of the founding fathers, but pro segregationists 
follow the actual actions they took, who are the true patriots? In the minds of the civil 
rights leaders, in order live up to patriotism and the ideals of America, her citizens must 
charge themselves with enforcing equality.  The change that these leaders demanded 58
was also shared by others not directly connected to the civil rights movement, but 
rather, the counterculture movement.
While the idea of the counterculture movement as a patriotic crusade may not 
seem very consequential, the question certainly deserves attention. Despite 
counterculture today being largely relegated to pop culture, there used to be a true 
rebellious and free spirit involved in it. With protesters and icons like Bob Dylan gaining 
much of their energy and methods from the Civil Rights movement, it is no wonder that 
it contained an air of patriotism, even if it did not always seem to do so.  The two main 59
movements I wish to discuss are the East coast oriented Youth International Party 
(Yippies), and the San Fransisco based hippie movements. The former, the Yippies, 
were the more protest oriented. Arguably their most prominent protest was at the 1968 
Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The unrest, like the Civil Rights Movement 
before it, asked the question: Who were the patriots, the protesters who had previously 
desecrated the American flag  or the Chicago police and Mayor Richard J. Daley who 60
opposed them?  The movement on the West Coast was markedly more calm. 61
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Exemplified by the experimentation with drugs such as LSD, the Grateful Dead, free 
love, and anti-bureaucracy, the west coast movement was much less a protest 
movement than an expression of freedom. In fact, after a noted activist became political 
at a Dead concert, Jerry Garcia expressed resentment, as the concert was not really 
meant to be overtly political.  However, mainstream Americans still expressed disgust 62
with the laziness of these young people who were apparently wasting the privilege they 
had been afforded and which previous generations did not have.  Again, who are the 63
patriots; the people trying to simply live life without politics, or those standing up for 
‘traditional American values’? Over time, generally, the traditional conservatism won out, 
and even got carried away in the following decades. 
Right wing nationalistic movements in the United States were, in large part, both 
the culmination of years of conservatism and a response to liberal events such as the 
Civil Rights Movement. However, this is not very unique, as it is how most nationalistic 
movements form, including the Black Nationalism Movement in the United States (only 
this movement was responding to a rise in conservatism).  One of the first prominent 64
far-Right conservative groups emerging in the late 1950s was the John Birch Society 
(JBS). While not overtly nationalistic, its existence arguably allowed for nationalistic 
groups to emerge. The stated goal of the JBS was to counter communism and labor, 
and to do this, they directly attacked Civil Rights leaders including MLK. To the JBS, 
Communism and Civil Rights were connected, with Communist agitation being the 
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primary motivator of the marches. However, the idea of a connection was not even 
solely confined to the far-Right either, as by 1965, a majority of the county believed 
there to be at least some kind of connection. This was largely the reason why one could 
often see signs such as “Support your local police”, because not doing so meant helping 
communists.  (This particular signage is vert similar to sentiments in modern America). 65
The next groups to emerge were overtly nationalistic; Robert DuPugh and the 
Minutemen organization and its branch, William Potter Gale and the United States 
Christian Posse (USCP). While the former was an blatantly far-right paramilitary group, 
it was the latter which truly began to wholeheartedly delve into racism and anti-
Semitism. With overlapping membership with the Ku Klux Klan, the USCP was 
concerned with gun rights, states rights, and white supremacy.  These far right groups 66
claimed to be patriots defending Christian-American values against Civil Rights 
Leadership and ‘Jewish plots.’  This type of abhorrent ‘patriotism’ is unfortunately still in 67
existence today, and arguably was the motivations behind monstrous acts from 
personal hate-crimes all the way to the Oklahoma City Bombing. These peoples’ views 
were mainly a response to an increasing multiculturalism in the United States brought 
upon by increased immigration.
Despite what the values of the United States have been stated to be in the 
constitution, and despite what some modern politicians will claim, America has never 
been as inclusive as it has claimed, and this is especially true towards immigrants. One 
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only need look at the Know-Nothing Party, the Chinese Exclusion Act, and the Second 
KKK to see this.  It is important to note that, despite occasional serious and virulent 68
xenophobia against white immigrants, there was still always a white verses non-white 
flavor to this. The implication here is that, while white immigrants have faced horrible 
persecution, as will be discussed in this section, they always were eventually able to 
merge with the accepted white-American spectrum. This was because poor white 
immigrants could identify more readily with elites, because they could be more easily 
assimilated by elite whites given their overt similarities, and because blacks had been 
persecuted for so long that racism against them had become ingrained in American 
society. Nativism in the United States was also always as much about poverty as it was 
about ethnicity. Two of the major immigration movements in the United States following 
the Civil War were between 1880 and 1924, and 1970 and 1998.  The first era saw a 69
shift to Eastern and Southern European Immigrants, while the second, later era, saw a 
change to Central and South America, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia.
Unsurprisingly, the main similarity between these two eras of mass immigration to 
the United Staes, unsurprisingly, is that both eras contain an air of nativism and even 
white supremacy. Essentially, in each era, an immigrant could not wave the flag of his or 
her old nation. There are, however, many other similarities in the eras. Firstly, both saw 
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a massive change in the area of origin for the new immigrants. This means that it was 
both alarming to the existing population and harder to assimilate for the immigrants. 
This means that it is easier for the existing Americans to form a xenophobic identity, as 
new immigrants are seen as very different. While some in both eras blatantly espoused 
racism, challenging the intelligence and charging the new immigrants with vulgarity, 
others claimed economic degradation as their reasoning. (This was largely done in 
order to avoid the often taboo race issue).  Another similarity is, sadly, the violence 70
immigrants faced in both eras. While the era between 1880 and 1920 saw massive 
lynch mobs and labor movements mobilized around violence towards immigrants, the 
era between 1970-1998 saw more personal, but often more violent and disturbing, hate 
crimes.  The point here is that while the groups of immigrants faced somewhat different 71
forms of violence, they both faced it in spades.
The latter had an exorbitant larger number of illegal immigrants than the former. 
During the earlier era, the main illegal immigration was the ‘white slavery’ trade in 
Eastern European women.  In the later period, large numbers of Central Americans 72
and East Asians entered the country illegally. While not actually changing the 
immigrants themselves, this vastly changes the arguments many make. A second 
difference is that the earlier group of immigrants faced discrimination that was 
enforceable by law. This entailed, among other things, literacy tests in voting and quotas 
in both schools and employment. This is not to say that immigrants in the latter era did 
 Jaret. “Troubled by Newcomers”. 12.70
 Jaret. “Troubled by Newcomers”. 15.71
 Jaret. “Troubled by Newcomers”. 16. 72
 31
not face legal discrimination, only that it was much more subtle, as unconcealed racial 
laws had largely become illegal by this point.  The final difference is the position of the 73
United States in the world, as both a goal for immigrants and as a more inviting society. 
While the era after the Civil War and before the First World War saw a large influx of 
immigrants, this was largely because of the insular prosperity of the country. In fact, 
much of this period was marked by heavy isolationism. On the other hand the period 
between 1945 and 2000 saw the United States emerge as a much more global power. 
This globalism largely fostered immigration.  Given all of these differences, one may 74
think that the nativism fostered in the two eras is dissimilar, but the same xenophobic 
concerns have come up time and time again in American history. 
Nativism in both eras of mass immigration into the United States was fostered by 
the same quasi-patriotic misgivings. The first concern was based around political 
concerns. Essentially, nativist Americans believe that aliens were subversive. While this 
was first alluded to when the First Red Scare was discussed above, it has been much 
more far-reaching than that. In the earlier era of immigration, almost every group was 
connected to some form of conspiracy, no matter how convoluted. To many Americans, 
the Germans were spies of the Kaiser, Catholics were subversives of the pope, Italians 
were anarchists and criminals, and Jews were Bolsheviks. In the more modern era, this 
trend continued, with many equating Asians, Central Americans, and South Americans 
as contributing to the drug and criminality problem. There were even rumors that 
Mexican Immigrants were planting themselves in the Southwest in order to take it back 
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from the United States.  Another point that many made (more in the earlier era), was 75
that these immigrants could not contribute to a democratic society, given that they were 
ruled by kings in Europe and are not accustomed to liberty.  Interestingly, there is a 76
similar argument made about Muslim Immigrants today. Other nativist arguments 
revolved around economic issues. In both eras, people blamed immigrants for taking 
their jobs or lowering their wages. Both eras of nativists claimed that Immigrants would 
inevitably become economically dependent on the government. In the early era, this 
constituted entering poor houses and becoming public charges.  In the later era it 
entailed allegations that immigrants inevitably file for welfare.  However, these 77
economic arguments are usually easily countered, as many studies have shown mass 
immigration to be good for society. An interesting economic argument that has only 
cropped up in the later era of immigration is the ownership of businesses by immigrants 
in minority neighborhoods. These immigrants, often Korean, Indian, or Arab are 
frequently resented by the residents because they are not seen as giving back to the 
community.  As is clear, each of these nativist ideals, in some way draws from the 78
patriotic concept of upholding democracy, rights, and freedom and defending ones 
fellow citizens. However, there are much more indefensibly xenophobic arguments 
based around the ‘social decimation’ of the United States.
In both eras of mass immigration to the United States, there have been some 
nativist arguments that revolve around perceived social issues caused by immigrants. 
 Jaret. “Troubled by Newcomers”. 20-21.75
 Jaret. “Troubled by Newcomers”. 22.76
 Jaret. “Troubled by Newcomers”. 31.77
 Jaret. “Troubled by Newcomers”. 27-28.78
 33
These arguments mainly revolved around the idea that they will eventually fracture 
America. These arguments always involve the conception that immigrants do not 
assimilate in American culture, and will eventually ruin it. This revolves around the 
differences in the cultures, ideals, and languages of the immigrants. While some like 
Teddy Roosevelt believed that Americanization of the immigrants could and should 
occur, others could not fathom this.  They even more thoroughly reject the idea of a 79
multicultural America. This is why nativists and xenophobes of the early and late eras 
rejected the cultures of Eastern and Southern Europeans Immigrants, and South 
American and Asian Immigrants, respectively. An ironic point they make is that these 
new groups do not share the same history, and cannot appreciate what it means to be 
an Americans.  What is ironic about this is that many of those bemoaning new 80
immigrants is that they are almost always descended from other immigrants, and thus 
cannot possibly claim American history if they disallow the new people to do so. What is 
sadly true about both these eras is, while there was certainly nativism during them, they 
also sparked massive increases in xenophobia in the years following. This idea implies 
that the era between 1998 and today has been increasingly nativist. The remainder of 
this essay will address this thesis.
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Chapter Two:
During the period between the Vietnam War and September 11th, 2001, the 
United States went through a few very important evolutions based upon conceptions of 
patriotism and xenophobia, which shaped its perspectives and actions in foreign and 
domestic policy. These positions formed the basis from which the United States 
attempted to grasp such a monumental tragedy 9/11. It is generally agreed that the 
Vietnam War challenged American ideas of exceptionalism and patriotism. While this is 
largely clear in the broad sense of the whole American zeitgeist, it should be clarified 
that the attitudes of common citizens were more complex. Regardless, the habitual and 
institutionalized rise of anti-patriotic attitudes, real or imagined, brought about a certain 
reckoning from the political Right, largely in the form of hawkish foreign policy, 
neoConservatism, and a return to traditional American values. 
Responding to the much maligned ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ and apparent hedonism 
of the 1960s, the conservatives reasserted American Exceptionalism both abroad and 
domestically, best exemplified by the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. 
Bush. The post-Cold War Era and Bill Clinton’s presidency were in many ways a 
response to these trends in turn. His presidency saw a rise in more ethical and 
intentional foreign intervention and an ethnic makeup that was edging towards healthy 
diversity. In these ways, the post-Vietnam War era saw the eventual development of a 
largely purposeful patriotism where America’s foreign policy was more careful and 
meaningful, and its domestic policy was inclining towards a multicultural state. However, 
these trends were largely bucked as a result of September 11th.
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There is a generally accepted narrative that the United States during the Vietnam 
War became very unpatriotic. While this was in many ways the case, as with other ideas 
about history, this was not the only scenario. The accepted narrative is that the youth of 
America were divided in two, with some going off to fight, and others refusing. The latter 
in this scenario have been, and often still are, viewed later on as cowards, spoiled, and 
subversive to the war effort and America.  However, this was not the case. While 81
Vietnam was certainly a war fought by the poor American man (lower income Americans 
were twice as likely to die in the war than even middle class men),  this is not to say 82
that all middle and upper class young people avoided the war out of resentment for their 
country. While the anti-war movement was certainly led by the American youth including 
college students, many young people had no ill will towards the United States. Many 
middle class kids were actively patriotic and feared the communists like all ‘good’ 
Americans were suppose to be. However, this did not mean that they wanted to fight 
and die half-way across the world.  Additionally, many simply did not understand the 83
War enough to be truly upset by it, leading to a resentment towards those protesting it 
so vigorously. These young people, combined with those who enjoyed counterculture 
but were apolitical, show that the Vietnam War narrative is much more complex than 
simply soldiers and unpatriotic subversives who hated the United States and were 
actively degrading it.  While the United States was arguably torn asunder in many 84
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ways, it should not be conceded that those who did not support the war hated America, 
God, or Capitalism, as many revisionists often claim. Regardless, ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ 
was being rallied against by conservatives.
The term ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ refers to the the allegation by conservatives that, 
after the War, the political left were unpatriotic and were restraining the country from 
exerting its might abroad. While used in a pejorative sense by the political right, it may 
not have been such a bad development. Hereafter, when ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ is 
referred to, it will be referring to the more conscious patriotism following such a 
controversial conflict rather than the conservative insult it is implied to be. The reason 
this term entered the lexicon was that Vietnam, unlike any conflict since the Civil War, 
split the country.  (This does not contradict the previous paragraph, as, again, many on 85
both sides were patriotic). In demanding an end to the war no matter the consequences, 
the American people damaged the pride and exceptionalism which had been building 
since the Second World War. This, in addition to the reckoning of Watergate, forced the 
United States to discuss national interests and actions in a different way.  While this 86
was seen by many as defeatist, it was simply more cautious and pragmatic. While this 
was plausibly a positive and maturing development for the country, the conservatives 
did not see it this way, leading to decades of Republican exceptionalism. This is where 
American patriotism was after Vietnam: either judicious or neutered, depending on who 
one asked.
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The patriotic sentiment of the United States, which lent itself to a willingness to 
assert the benefits of the democracy and capitalism abroad, was largely depleted after 
the Vietnam War. A quintessential example of this was the refusal to use
 military force during the Angolan Civil War under Gerald Ford. When the President 
contemplated intervention, Congress quickly denied him the possibility.  Up until the 87
late 1980s, Democrats rejected intervention into countries which even resembled 
Vietnam. They viewed any such attack as both immoral and unnecessary. This type of 
of military hesitation is largely what made the Republicans invent the term ‘Vietnam 
Syndrome’. They viewed the flinching as risking a concession of the Cold War,  loss of 
Superpower status, degrading of patriotism, and forfeiture of world leadership. This idea 
brought about vast historic revisionism of the War and the presumption that the United 
States was infallible, but merely handicapped by the unpatriotic.  This concept was part 88
of the core rhetoric of Ronald Reagan. 
Upon joining the Republican Party, Ronald Reagan became a standard bearer 
for American Conservatism. His right leaning rhetoric can be traced as far back as the 
1960s, and more specifically, during the 1964 Presidential Election when he made his 
famous ‘A Time for Choosing’ speech in favor of candidate Barry Goldwater. In it, he 
rallied against what he saw as the most prominent issues facing the United States; 
mainly Communists, elites, and Lyndon Johnson’s ‘great society’.  His speech 89
contained the patriotic hyperbole which defined Reagan’s career, including his 
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subsequent governorship and 1976 Presidential Run. In fact, one can see a 
development of further patriotic, jingoistic even, rhetoric. In his governorship between 
1967 to 1975, Reagan championed against the lawlessness he saw in protests, at one 
point even threatening to criminalize them. In his view, the unpatriotic protesters had 
emboldened the Vietcong to continue the war against the United States.  During his 90
failed 1976 Presidential run, Reagan continued this patriotic platform. Essentially, his 
campaign was run on a promise to end détente with the Soviet Union, which he was 
known for in retrospect.  In this way, Reagan was reasserting American patriotism 91
before he was even in the highest office in the land.
By his second run for president, Reagan had fully formed his practically 
nationalistic platform. By the 1980 Republican National Convention, he was arguing that 
virtually all of America’s issues could be traced back to the liberalism and disloyalty of 
the 1960s. Despite losing her way, he was of the opinion that The United States could 
reassert her power and spirit abroad. Essentially, this was his main appeal as a 
candidate and first term President. Optimism and exceptionalism would purge the 
weakness and self doubt which he believed so embodied the 1960s.  In his mind, 92
America was entering an era of renewal. By his second term, it was his goal to make 
the  people believed their country to be prouder and stronger than ever, with renewed 
military purpose and patriotism. This idea was embodied so enticingly by the slogan, ‘Its 
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Morning in America, Again’.  While this certainly appears to be a constructive goal, it 93
had its chauvinistic and bellicose side in practice.
The issues with Reagan Era Patriotism are mainly regarding the refusal to admit 
the mistakes of the country in the past, and the denial of any legitimacy of any regime’s 
claim to challenge the United States in the present or future. As argued above, the 
efforts of Reagan and other conservatives to distance America from the ‘mistakes’ of 
Vietnam era disloyalty led to severe revisionism of the era. The claims made ranged 
from saying there were no American War Crimes, to the argument that the war could 
have been won if the armed forces had been mobilized totally, early. Additionally, and 
more dangerously for the future of protesting other government actions, some claimed 
that it was a hostile media and anti-war movements which had lost the war for 
America.  In using undeniably patriotic rhetoric to attack free press and protesters, 94
Reagan and the other conservatives set a very dangerous precedent for the future of 
this fourth estate. Unfortunately, many have adopted this tactic for use today as well. 
The other danger of Reagan Era Patriotism was the gung-ho attitude towards opposing 
those regimes which disagreed with the United States or apposed it ideologically.
In a post-Vietnam War Era world, resisting the democratic, capitalist system must 
have appeared attractive to many nations of the world. Reagan sought to put an end to 
this by employing patriotism. An ardent and steadfast patriot himself, he strove to 
increase the arms budget in a massive way, aid all anti communists, and end détente 
with Russia (as he promised in his campaign). While the latter of these goals arguably 
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did produce dividends in contributing to the fall of the Soviet Union, the former goals 
were more controversial, and at times, illegal. These were embodied by an attempt to 
increase nuclear forces in Europe, despite NATO not being entirely permissive, and 
increased aid to anti-communist insurgents, most notably to the Contra Rebels in 
Nicaragua.  Essentially, much of Reagan’s patriotism revolved around justifying military 95
action designed to disrupt the spread communism and, more importantly, ending the 
dreaded ‘Vietnam Syndrome’. During his presidency, this was also seen in the support 
of the El Salvadorian Government in fighting Communist guerrillas during the El 
Salvadorian Civil War and the Invasion of Grenada in 1983.  Despite his actions, 96
American patriotism had not yet reached pre-Vietnam magnitudes quite yet. For many, 
the war was still fresh in their minds and they were not ready to wave the flag so whole 
heartedly. This, in addition to the Iran-Contra Scandal and the tragic bombing of the 
Marine Corps Base in Beirut, Lebanon, meant that the American people were still sick 
with the unpatriotic ‘Vietnam Syndrome’.  It became the task of George H.W. Bush to 97
finally end this ailment.
Like his predecessor, Reagan, Bush Sr. sought to fully reinvigorate American 
Patriotism through militarism, and his biggest action therein was Dessert Storm. What 
separated Bush Sr.’s militarism from Reagan's was what would become know as the 
‘Powell Doctrine’, named for then-General Colin Powell. Essentially this ideology was 
based around the ideas of full military force, only used as a last resort, and only if the 
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public supported it.  In this way, Bush Sr. waged a war on the Persian Gulf much 98
different than Reagan ever did in any of the conflicts during his Presidency. It was the 
goal of Bush Sr. to ensure the American people knew that a Vietnam-esqe quagmire 
could be avoided, and thus stopped short of entering Baghdad to overthrow Saddam 
Hussain or of supporting Shiite Militants. In doing this, it was claimed that ‘Vietnam 
Syndrome’ was “buried in the Arabian dessert”.  Despite this claim was likely a bit 99
premature (the American people continued worrying about intervention all throughout 
the 1990s), Bush Sr. and the immensely successful campaign led by General 
Schwarzkopf went a long way in reasserting patriotism as an important factor in 
American life. This type of red-white-and-blue rhetoric was also a main factor in 
domestic issues during the period of Bush Sr.’s presidency.
Even before the Persian Gulf War, Bush Sr. was using Patriotism to drum up 
support for himself. During the election of 1988, he was accusing his opponent, 
Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis, of being unpatriotic. His claims to this were 
based around the facts that Dukakis was a member of the American Civil Liberties 
Union and that his wife, Kitty, was previously an ardent protester, possibly even a flag 
burner.  In addition to attacking his opponent’s patriotic legitimacy, Bush Sr. promoted 100
his own. He did this by building up issues such as the necessity for the pledge of 
allegiance in schools and criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision that flag burning was 
legal, then claiming that in supporting the former and decrying the latter, he was the only 
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true patriot and viable candidate.  Whether this was scrupulous or not is somewhat 101
irrelevant. By using this patriotic rhetoric, Bush was able to catapult himself to office. 
This showed that issues revolving around patriotic loyalty were viable issues to exploit 
in politics.  Interestingly, in a report four years after the 1988 Election, some 102
commentators still did not view the use of patriotism in politics as an issue. 
The report entitled “Patriotism, Politics, and the Presidential Election of 1988”, by 
John L. Sullivan, Amy Fired, and Mary G. Dietz, cited multiple times above, is very 
useful in exploring the use of patriotism in a political way by George H.W. Bush. 
Essentially, they conclude the piece by discussing the fact that, given the precedent set 
by such politicians as Reagan and Bush Sr. in the Elections of 1984 and 1988, 
respectively, politicians knew how to use patriotism as a tool to win elections. In the 
words of the writers, said patriotism became a “symbolic cloak…in which political 
leaders seek to wrap themselves.”  They continue to argue that this use of patriotic 103
rhetoric is in fact a bastardization of the traditional rebellious meaning of the term. 
Essentially, given that patriotism embodied rebellion against a tyrannical crown in 
England, it is misused in promoting conformity.  However, the essay ended on a 104
somewhat optimistic note, with the authors believing politics had not yet become so 
adulterated to be a major issue problem. In their words, patriotism and actions 
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committed in the name of it was not yet “soundbite politics.”  This does beg the 105
question of whether or not it became so in the subsequent years. The decade which 
ushered in the end of the Cold War provides very interesting examples on this question, 
and perhaps ushers in an era where patriotism is ‘soundbite politics’.
After the end of the Cold War, America had to find a new direction with which to 
mobilize patriotism. Without the Soviet Union as the enemy of liberty, a new type of 
patriotic jingoism gradually emerged in the 1990s: Militaristic exportation of 
humanitarianism. The main evolutions of this occurred in Somalia and Bosnia. The 
Somali conflict was an event which triggered a major development for the United States. 
After the Battle of Mogadishu, the people of the United States realized a few important 
facts: Firstly, that they could no longer afford to underestimate local nationalism, and 
second, that the United States could no longer serve as world police.  These 106
realizations came from the anti-interventionism of the American people; arguably a 
resurgence of Vietnam Syndrome. This non-aggressive nature then leant itself to the 
American views on the Bosnian Conflict. Because of the evening news, people saw the 
tragic conflict happening in real time, such as the abhorrent Srebrenica Massacre, but 
because of the non-interventionism, they would not accept large scale conflict.  In an 107
attempt to keep his distance to a degree, Bill Clinton only sanctioned air strikes. While 
this arguably led to a positive outcome, it can be argued that America ignored a different 
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tragedy in an effort to remain anti-interventionist: The Rwandan Genocide.  108
Essentially, this type of humanitarian militarism is what American patriotism had become 
before 2001.
Interestingly, the desire to export American patriotic values changed political 
sides during Bill Clinton’s presidency. Between Vietnam and the mid 1990s, it had 
mainly been the conservatives who had been attempting to spread capitalism and 
democracy abroad. However, during Clinton’s presidency, it was mainly the democrats 
who sought to spread justice across the world and stop tragedy.  While these are 109
different exports, they represent perceived American values. Arguably the most 
important example of this was the NATO intervention into the Kosovo War in 1999, 
given how close in time it was to September 11th. Essentially, in order to prevent 
genocide, NATO Forces led by The United States jumped into action, but in order to 
prevent quagmire, halted the intervention to airstrikes. In this way, the military actions by 
the United States in the late 1990s led to much more shrewd American intervention, 
with patriotism permitted for only humanitarian intervention, but still limited in order to 
avoid lengthy entanglement.  Arguably, this is a much smarter form of foreign policy 110
based patriotism. Although it had its issues such as the hesitation to intervene in 
Rwanda, it conceivably made the United States a much more judicious world leader. 
However, this was not to be, since September 11th allowed for the more conservative 
patriotism to thrive. Now Islam was the main adversary of traditional American values, 
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rather than communism, as it had been previously. However, it can not be thought that 
only patriotism went through modifications between the Vietnam War and the 1990s, as 
ideas of race, nationalism, and social non-conformity did as well.
Like patriotism, the ethnic and social landscapes of America went through 
important changes between the 1960s and 2001, which decided how groups such as 
Arab Americans were viewed in the Twenty-first century. It is no big secret that the 
1960s saw a rise in permissiveness and liberalism which later provoked a backlash from 
conservatives. What was less clear, but equally true, was that this backlash was forming 
very quickly even as early as the late 1960s, again signaled by the ascendancy of 
political leadership such as Ronald Reagan.  While the rise in neoconservatism was of 111
course characterized by hawkish foreign policy—as mentioned above—it was also 
typified by a charge against social liberalism. Again, this is no big secret, but the rise in 
traditional values is essential in explaining America’s relationship with race, and 
specifically with Arab-Americans in the twenty-first century. Politically skilled politicians 
like Reagan blamed social policies for all of the United States ills. While this worked in 
some senses in reinvigorating American confidence, it also divided the country along 
easily discernible racial, social and political lines which came to depend largely on one’s 
perception of ‘American values’. Arab and Muslim Americans were no exceptions to this, 
and their ideas of loyalty needed to be formed around the values idealized after the 
1960s
In an effort to promise a return to order, neoconservatives rallied against 
President Johnson and capitalized on the apprehensions forming around the 1960s. 
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Attacking ‘welfare queens’ and protesters, there were clear arguments based around 
‘traditional American values’; aid values being economic self reliance and unquestioning 
support for American actions.  A main issue with these arguments was that they 112
implied that all those who relied on more government assistance and who were 
unsupportive of American foreign actions were un-American. This meant that clear 
‘American verses un-American’ social and ethnic lines were formed, which have lasted 
up to the modern day. These lines were especially exacerbated by the established 
political order leaning more Republican after Johnson.  This type of American 113
traditionalism continued up to the Reagan era, with the 1960s being blamed for all 
American problems.
With a rise in crime, hard drug use, and a decline in education, morality, and 
discipline perceived by conservatives in the 1980s, there must have been a reason. 
Believing that the social and political permissiveness of the 1960s was to blame for all 
these issues, Reagan argued that the decade of hedonism had devastated traditional 
Americanism.  With campaigns such as ‘Just Say No’ under his wife Nancy, the 114
Reagan Administration appealed to the conservative nature of many citizens while 
ostracizing those who did drugs as inherently wrong and immoral. In addition to this, 
Reagan sought to crackdown on crime and limit social freedoms. With his nomination of 
the heavily conservative Robert Bork to the Supreme Court in 1987, he showed his 
intention to reestablish what he believed to be social order and traditional 
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Americanism.  During the same time, Reagan attempted to reestablish the role of 115
religion in America. 
Believing a permissive society was destroying America, Reagan championed 
reestablishing the rule of a few ‘basic truths’ that were being ignored. Seeing chaotic 
liberalism as the reason for problems in America ranging from laziness to the HIV crisis, 
he wanted to reassert American moral superiority.  The issues with this are varied, but 116
essential in understanding the country’s contemporary racial and social issues, as well 
as its equation of Christianity with patriotism. Firstly, in describing homosexuals and 
drug addicts as inherently immoral, they become pariahs who did not represent 
America, but in fact degraded it.  The former is inherently tied to race as well, as it is 117
mainly poorer minorities who are victims of drug epidemics, such as during the crack 
epidemic.  This set a dangerous precedent in differentiating races by morality, whether 118
intentionally or as a product of systemic crackdowns on issues such as drug use. 
Additionally, the description of LGBTQ liberation as immoral brings up the other ‘basic 
truth’ which Regan wanted to reestablish; Christianity as the fundamental standard-
bearer for moral America. In equating Christianity with ethics, and then ethics with 
politics and social order, religion became a major factor in being an upstanding citizen of 
the United States.  While Christianity has long been a factor in defining America, 119
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revising steps made in the previous decades towards religious cohesion certainly had a 
negative impact on the United States, which continued through the twenty-first century. 
This all had ramifications in the post September 11th era, where traditional values made 
a resurgence based around the ideals formed under Reagan, which then went on to 
define the lives of many Arab and Muslim Americans. What is interesting, however, is 
that despite many of these issues reemerging in the 2000s as hallmarks of 
conservatism, America saw the arguable development of a positive and healthy post-
nationalism in the 1990s.
In 1997, Bill Clinton commissioned the report entitled “One America in the 21st 
Century: The President's Initiative on Race”, which provides vital information in 
assessing the situation of race in America just prior to 2001. Very established racial 
historians and professors took part in writing the report and painted a very honest and 
somewhat optimistic picture for the future of America. A discussion of this report is 
incredibly important as it shows what the American racial landscape was like just prior to 
2001, and how America would have been a very different country in terms of race 
relations had 9/11 not occurred.
First contained in Clinton’s initiative on race is a discussion of white verses 
minority opinions on racial questions facing the nation. The authors wrote that, 
essentially, white Americans have very different, often dated, views as compared to 
other ethnic groups. For many caucasian Americans, their assimilation had occurred 
generations ago, so their views were out of touch with modern society, specifically the 
fact that ethnic distributions were changing. This is evidenced by the fact that it was 
mainly people of color who used the government more instrumentally in addressing 
 49
discrimination.  This points to a general trend among white Americans; not active 120
racism, but complacency and ignorance. In the report, studies showed that only 36 
percent of caucasian Americans believed that there were still issues with race in 
America in 1997.  What is contemporarily called ‘white privilege’ was then described 121
as an ignorance of the subtle racism that occurs systematically on a daily basis. What is 
interesting is that this creates a unique situation for Muslim and Arab-Americans. Even 
in 1997, more than any other race, ethnic, or religious group, Arab and Muslim 
Americans faced active and pejorative racism, rather than inactive and subtle issues 
with ‘white privilege’ or ignorance.  This is a trend which was only worsened by the 122
events of September 11th, 2001. The report goes on to discuss the future of race in 
America rather optimistically in terms of multiculturalism; a future in which, by 2050, only 
53 percent of Americans would be white.  Given this statistic, Was America ready for 123
this eventuality? This also ties into the ideas of multiculturalism. With the report that 
America would only become more diverse in the coming decades, it is also implied that 
the issues surrounding race would no longer be localized to white and black Americans. 
It was of the opinion of the writers that the United States had not yet risen to that 
challenge, and needed to address the problems quickly. Their suggestions were meant 
to change America for the better, but were they heeded in a post September 11th United 
States?
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Before discussing whether the issues of race were addressed, it is important to 
discuss what the writers of the Clinton Initiative pointed to as the biggest issues. The 
first big issue the writers saw was the simplistic classification of race in America. The 
issues with this are varied, but they main problems come down to the fact that they are 
generally arbitrary, they get in the way of mutual understanding, and they often 
mischaracterize people.  These issues have always been particularly poignant when 124
discussing broad groups such as Arab-Americans and Muslim Americans. The waters 
become very muddied when people focus on larger group distinctions and the 
differences between them. Healthy discussion of race is truly hard when 
characterizations and stereotypes are imprinted on groups.  This idea only worsened 125
for Arab-Americans after September 11th. Another important issue which the authors 
saw was regarding the addition of vast numbers of new ethnic groups to the American 
landscape. Most research on race relations in America prior to the twenty-first century 
was regarding the systemic racism against black Americans by white. The report points 
specifically to the “Kerner Commission” 30 years prior.  While obviously a vital 126
discussion to continue to have, it was important for the writers that discussions of other 
ethnic groups emerge as well. However, just prior to September 11th, important 
developments were occurring in regards to patriotism, xenophobia, and Arab and 
Muslim American Identity.
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In the few years prior to 2001, a few very distinct forms of patriotism emerged in 
the United States. The three main forms which emerged in the post-Cold War nineties, 
and which have seen somewhat of a renaissance in recent years, are symbolic, 
environmental and iconoclastic. (There were a few others, but they were not polled as 
being very popular).  Symbolic patriotism appears to be the most nationalistic, where 127
the patriot is one who views the most important aspects of the country as being its 
symbols; flags, colors, etcetera. Environmental patriots generally believe in the natural 
wonders of the country. This means that all who degrade said land with 
overdevelopment are not patriotic. Finally, iconoclastic patriots are those who believe 
that the spirit of a nation belong in its principals, such as those laid out in the 
constitution.  This is the patriotism most associated with the idea of ‘Civic Nationalism’ 128
mentioned in chapter one of this thesis. It is the argument of the next chapter that 
Americans went from being more iconoclastically patriotic in the late 1990s to more 
symbolic in the time after September 11th, having  regressed in this regard after 2001. 
However, patriotism was not the only American ideal that was arguably at a positive 
point during the late 1990s. The country had become a tenably post-National state, 
where ethnicity and culture did not halter a citizen’s ability to identify as an American.
The post-nationalist America which emerged in the 1990s was one of 
multiculturalism and outward policy. However, this did not mean that the this concept did 
not contain any contradictions. Essentially, while breaking down nationalism and 
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integrating cultures in the United States during the 1990s was certainly an admirable 
goal, it still placed America at the forefront of the world stage. Essentially, in a post-
national world, the United States had the ability and justification to export its values of 
diversity across the world.  This is essentially promoting a sort of American 129
exceptionalism which had been seen before, except with different concepts such as 
democracy. In this image, the United States is unique amongst nations, absent of 
cultural struggles. Unfortunately, this was not truly the case.  Despite this glaring 130
contradiction, this new Americanism was certainly a change from the traditional ideals of 
jingoism and spreading vague ideas of capitalism and democracy. This was best 
exemplified by the humanitarian foreign intervention largely exercised by the Clinton 
administration in Somalia and Kosovo. Despite this, after 2001, America began 
exporting the previously civilizing ideals it had before (which will be discussed in more 
detail later). In addition to American multiculturalism developing in the decades before 
2001, specific consciousnesses of cultures were also emerging. Most notably, Arab-
Americans were gaining a very significant foothold in American life.
Just prior to September 11th, a genuine Arab American identity was emerging. As 
with most other ethnicities in the history of the 20th Century United States, Arab 
consciousness in the country was being formed around a political cause. The cause 
which Arab Americans rallied around the the question of Israel, the real genesis of which 
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was arguably the Six-Day War in 1967.  Prior to this conflict, Arab-Americans had 131
largely been trying to assimilate and fit into society. However, through this conflict and 
the subsequent American support for Israel, Arabs in the United States gained a certain 
level of identity which made their experiences in the country more unique. By the 1990s, 
many Arab-Americans and scholars had recognized that they had “made a 
breakthrough.”  This was celebrated through celebrations of Arab culture. Finally, it 132
seemed, Arab-American children were beginning to be proud to identify as such in a 
way which differentiated them from other Americans.  This meant that not only were 133
they a unique group in the American melting pot, but they could be politically active 
without being accused of being unpatriotic. In addition to the cultural and political 
consciousness being achieved by Arab Americans in the 1990s, major scholarship was 
also beginning to be dedicated to them, only to be halted by September 11th. 
Just prior to September 11th, 2001, Arab Americans were finally receiving the 
scholarship they deserved. As mentioned, after the Arab-Israeli conflict began in 
earnest, Arab-Americans became quite politically active. In addition to allowing them to 
assert their cultural uniqueness, this activism also finally began paying dividends in 
terms of serious scholarship in the late 1990s.  While this can arguably be traced, at 134
least in part, to more serious acts of violence such as the 1993 World Trade Center 
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Bombing, it can also be heavily traced to an realization of inherent connection with other 
minorities in the country. Many people began to realize that the orientalism which Arabs 
faced, mainly the sentimentalized image of Arab and Muslim culture, similarly set them 
back in society to how other groups had been.  (This is not to say that the actual 135
actions of white Americans towards Arabs was close to the brutality of institutions such 
as slavery, only that they were being persecuted in way which resembled some people’s 
ignorance of the lasting effects of slavery on African American’s social standing in the 
country). Because of this demand for recognition, prior to 2001, Arabs were arguably 
about to become a political force in the country. However, after September 11th, it was 
the politicians and regular Americans who in turn began to demand what Arabs stood for 
in the country.  In this way, while Arab-Americans were arguably about to escape the 136
periphery of society in the 1990s, they were forced right into the middle of it after 
September 11th, and not in a positive way.
The suggested solutions to issues with American race relations contained in the 
“Clinton Initiative on Race” are important to discuss as they show the progress the 
country was ready to make just prior to September 11th, and how much the current 
situation is a deviation from the projected course. It has taken the United States nearly 
two decades to finally attempt to reassess these ideas, and this is a slow process at 
that. The first suggestion is simply an enforcement of Civil Rights laws, as many 
Americans faced punishable and preventable discrimination. The reason this 
enforcement was often blocked, in the opinions of the authors, came down to a mixture 
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of lack of funding and data.  (Unfortunately, this trend only worsened after 2001). 137
Another solution suggested by the authors of the report was simple education on race 
and race relations. All Americans should understand the all encompassing nature of the 
values of the country, but were often stifled in their education of this early in life. When 
discrimination and stereotypes are taught early on in children, they become incredibly 
hard to dispel later on. This becomes even worse when these stereotypes are ignored, 
or even encouraged by adults.  This encouragement could easily come from faulty 138
patriotism. The final major solution suggested by the authors surround the relationship 
between minorities and law enforcement and authority figures. For society to be equal 
and effective, everybody must be able to trust the justice of the United States, but often 
cannot. Profiling and systemic issues with incarceration contribute to the antagonism 
between peoples.  The most visible example of this today and at the time of the 139
report’s authoring was the intrinsic racism of the American justice system towards 
blacks and latinos. This unfortunately remains a dire issue in 2018. In the same way 
today, Arab-Americans need to be able to trust the government, but often cannot. 
Essentially, the ‘Clinton Initiative on Race’ provided for a candid but hopeful exploration 
into the future of race relations in America. 
The period from the Vietnam Era to the 1990s saw the rise and fall of both 
xenophobia and symbolic patriotism. Just prior to 2001, the Clinton administration 
arguably saw the emergence of a positive form of patriotism which dispelled racism and 
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encouraged multiculturalism. However, despite the trajectory of the nation being quite 
positive in the developing post-nationalist America, September 11th made the country 
veer off path, and towards racism and suspicion. 
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Chapter Three:
Just Prior to September 11th, patriotism and Arab and Muslim-American identity 
in the United States was reaching a healthy point, but the tragedy in New York and 
Washington D.C. completely shattered this. Prior to 2001, patriotism in the United 
States had emerged from the presidencies of Reagan, Bush Sr., and Clinton as an 
arguably positive force, despite years of back and forth, and despite the two Republican 
presidents’ intentions to make it more nationalistic. While different people still had 
differing interpretations of the idea, it was generally forcing positive introspection. This is 
similar to the lives of Arab-Americans, who likewise were forming an important identity 
in the country. However, September 11th contained two additional casualties when the 
towers fell. In the immediate aftermath, very jingoistic and nationalistic opinions were 
voiced regarding the United State’s role in the world as a benevolent leader, as well as 
Arabs’ and Muslims’ role in the country, respectively. Essentially American patriotism 
changed almost fundamentally. In the following months and years, distinct actions were 
made which reenforced these new ideas, and in turn provided for extremely severe 
appropriations of rights and justice. In addition to white America’s views changing, Arab-
Americans had to adapt to the new social order, and are continuing to do so today. 
Indeed, September 11th completely devastated the emerging positive patriotism and 
multiculturalism which had taken America so long to forge.  
On September 11th, 2001, the United States and the world was changed in a 
way that will alter them for generations to come. Arguably the most effected Americans 
in the immediate aftermath, other than families of the victims and New Yorkers, were 
Arab and Muslim Americans. This was because these Americans felt not only all the 
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pain, grief, sadness, and anger which all other citizens felt from such a heinous act, but 
also fear and betrayal. Arab and Muslim Americans were in fear of reprisals for being 
the same ethnicity and religion as the attackers, and betrayal from both those of their 
own religion and by those Americans who participated in the hate crimes which 
inevitably did come.  Reported on October 6th, 2001, The New York Times claimed 140
that “Perhaps hundreds of hate crimes have been directed at Middle Easterners, 
Muslims and Sikhs throughout the country since Sept. 11, crimes ranging form 
vandalism to verbal assaults to the murder of a Sikh restaurant owner in Arizona 
mistaken for an Arab.”  It must be remembered that around one percent of the victims 141
of the attacks were Muslim, which was also around the percentage of Americans who 
were Muslim total.  Because of this, it was absolutely just for Muslim Americans to feel 142
the same outrage as other citizens, if it had not been just before. In addition to this, it 
was also justifiable that Arab and Muslim Americans asked for calm amongst their fellow 
Americans.  Sadly, in the following months, this was not heeded. 143
In the months following September 11th, Americans found it difficult to temper 
their feelings. Some of the most spirited and violent hate crimes came in the first three 
months after the tragedy, and it was not only Arabs and Muslims who bore the brunt of 
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this. All people with brown skin color were victimized by hate and violence.  On March 
11th, 2002 the New York Times reported that “attacks on Asian-Americans, particularly 
Pakistani and Indian Immigrants, increased greatly in the United States in the weeks 
after Sept. 11…”  Even some groups who claimed to be defending their own faith, 144
such as the Jewish Defense League, took part.  Few Americans were exempt from 145
this hate, which also bled into a denial of civil rights. In the short time after 9/11, Arab 
Americans began being denied the basic entitlements of citizens, including but not 
limited to, the ability to become pilots, profiling at airports, color coding for danger on 
airplanes, and a general denial of service by businesses.  Muslims were feeling what 146
The New York Times reported on April 25th, 2002, as “quiet but persistent discrimination 
against them in their everyday social transactions.”  Regardless of what a person or 147
company believes to be justice for America, these were transparent denials of civil 
rights. Unfortunately, this did not matter at the time, and these slights were permitted to 
occur. In addition to general citizens, more public figures also took part in the assault 
and defense of Arab-Americans. 
September 11th was an attack on all of America, its supposed ideals and its 
identity, no matter what some of those Americans think of them. Because of this, every 
American citizen had the right to react to it. The issue with this was, when many of 
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America’s ideals are contradictory, depending on the citizen asked, there will be 
countless different reactions. To wit, there were countless different types of hate which 
many felt, and these are worth discussing. Essentially, xenophobia in the United States 
took a few different forms following September 11th. Exclusive xenophobia is where 
Americans believe that by dint of being different, Arabs and Muslims did not even exist 
in the imagined community. Possessive xenophobia is where a person believes that the 
outsider does not exist in the community, and is a subsequent drain on it. Finally, toxic 
xenophobia is where the American believes that the Arab or Muslim American does not 
exist in the community, and that they are in fact trying to undermine it.  While the 148
former two are often more unthinking, or at least benign enough to not cause panic, the 
latter is extremely characteristic of the virulent hatred which Arab and Muslim Americans 
felt. For example, the beliefs that the building of a Mosque or wearing of a Hijab are 
antiAmerican are, by definition, toxic xenophobia. Because some believed these were 
threats to American freedom is a hatred which is extremely characteristic of 
Islamophobia.  It was through nationalist feelings that toxic xenophobia emerged in 149
the United States.
Like with xenophobia, there are different forms of nationalism which emerged 
following September 11th. The first, more benign type is a type of everyday nationalism. 
This sentiment is taught early in life in schools with the pledge of allegiance. It is 
because of this nationalism that younger Muslim and Arab children become 
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marginalized for being different. Additionally, because of the more extreme forms of 
nationalism, this is often overlooked.  This more extreme nationalism is when 150
somebody uses patriotic sentiment to justify the civil rights violations against Arabs and 
Muslims in the United State.  Both of these nationalisms feed on a certain imagined 151
community, where the nation is never complete, but needs constant readdressing to 
decide who is to be excluded. In America, Muslims and Arabs have continually been 
excluded. A ban on mosques or a hijab is an extension of the orientalism which has 
characterized the United State’s relationship with its Muslim and Arab citizens. As with 
the perceived colonial superiority of the past, western religious, moral and democratic 
superiority characterize American views on Muslims and Arabs. The main difference 
between now and then is that the groups are vilified as violent rather than 
romanticized.  This plays directly into the role of patriotism in Islamophobia, given how 152
dependent American patriotism became on religion and democracy, especially after 
September 11th.
Religious leaders, pundits, and politicians all quickly emerged following 
September 11th to join in the discussion on what was to be done about Arabs and 
Muslims in the United States. Sadly, but unsurprisingly, much of the discourse was very 
negative and in many cases was bordering on, or even crossing into, hate speech. 
Many religious leaders were very vocal in denouncing Islam as a rejection of American 
values. In connecting America and patriotism with Christian traditionalism, many 
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religious leaders set Muslims apart from other Americans.  Politicians and pundits 153
were arguably more virulent in their hatred, but many similarly relied on evoking the 
Judeo-Christian values so often associated with America and its allies. In 2002, House 
Majority Leader Dick Armey made headlines by calling for Israel to expel all Palestinians 
from the West Bank. While this may not inherently be violent, it would still be an ethnic 
cleansing of the region.  This abhorrent comment can be seen as an effort by Armey 154
to pursue closer relations with Israel by espousing American hate against Arabs. Pundit 
Ann Coulter arguably adopted worse positions, but positions which were much more in 
line with Christian American values nonetheless. She called for America to enter Muslim 
countries and convert them to Christianity by force.  While this espousal for a new 155
crusade was on its face negating traditional ideals of patriotism, and even those 
developed in the 1990s, they were reflective of what many Americans believed. In this 
way, it can be argued that this was the reemergence of a jingoistic patriotism not seen 
since years previously. Some, however, sought to support their fellow Americans. 
On September 28th, 2001, The New York Times reported that “American Muslims 
and Arab groups have enlisted government officials, Islamic Scholars and even [the] 
teenage pop star [Mandy Moore] to combat what many fear could be a rising tide of 
harassment of hate.”  However, this support was often seen as unpatriotic in turn, or 156
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elitist and out of touch with the views of common Americans.  While this shows that 157
some tried to resist this in favor of a more inclusive national feeling, they were not very 
successful, and Arab and Muslim Americans had to ask themselves whether they could 
share in the collective American identity.
September 11th, like no other event before it, challenged the hegemony of the 
United States. The main responses to this were the seizure of civil rights under the 
guise of patriotism and protecting Americans, and war in the Mid-East and South-
Central Asia.  The prevailing mentality of the country considered opposition to either of 158
the measures a rejection of what the county stood for. The mentality was that, ‘if the 
terrorists hate everything America stands for, and you disapprove of some of what it 
stands for, then you are on par with the enemy’.  The error with this idea is that 159
America is a land of contradictions, and one can not possibly approve of all aspects of 
it. Regardless, for the first time since 1812, the war was on American mainland shores, 
which meant patriotism looked inward; for the first time in almost 200 years, Americans 
felt what other countries feel during war. This meant that the United States equated 
security with nationalism, and the return to simplistic peace with traditional 
Americanism.  This return to patriotic rhetoric not seen since Bush Sr. was marked by 160
a massive change in what was being reported in regards to both foreign and domestic 
issues. At the time, controversial opinions were being rejected by more popular and 
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palatable ones inside of the country. When this happens, the rest of the world views a 
much different story the the United States was seeing.  The further response to the 161
attacks was the emergence of a largely binary system of good versus evil. 
After September 11th, the rhetoric of the United States resembled that of the 
early Cold War. With the sole military superpower on the planet suddenly becoming a 
victim, a system emerged which viewed good and evil as absolutes. In this system, 
America represented a certain type purity in the world, while terrorists and those who 
resembled them representing an the absolute malice.  This was similar to how 162
Communists were seen around the 1950s. Further than this, the more Americans have 
rallied around the symbolism of America, the more they worry about somebody 
disrupting them.  Given the ethnic nature of much or this insularism, the people who 163
would be suspected of disrupting the symbols would be those who did not resemble 
these traditional national values. While the obvious victims of this are Arab and Muslim 
Americans, it can arguably lead to more xenophobia against any minority. Overall, 
September 11th ushered in a new era for American history on both a personal and 
national level.
As well as the ‘good verses evil’ system which emerged, a binary system also 
emerged which claimed that America was the only legitimate state actor in the War on 
Terror. This was largely reflective of the trend of American policy of the time, where the 
country was taught to dig in and defend against an attack from all sides. Essentially, this 
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meant that while the United States represented state validity and law, its enemies were 
characterized by an anarchical chaos.  In this system displays of patriotic fervor 164
become absolutely vital, and borders become the only protection from disorder. In this 
way, despite the fact that the hijackers entered the country legally, Americans espouse a 
sense of ‘digging in’ and protecting the country from the chaos brought in from 
abroad.  In addition to being a clear precursor to general xenophobia, it is also a 165
fundamental change in the way American’s relationship to the rest of world is viewed 
domestically. In the aftermath of September 11th, maps become three dimensional, with 
cultures and social groups becoming as important as other nation’s borders. It then 
becomes the goal of America to ensure that this disintegration of boundaries does not 
occur domestically as well.  In this way, ‘digging in’ paradoxically has two effects: It 166
creates an ‘us verses them’ mentality which manifests itself as state patriotism and 
reassurance of borders, while simultaneously deconstructing the concept of a state in 
general by creating actors who subvert and actors who uphold the nation on the 
inside.  In America, this had sweeping effects.167
The threat of terroristic borderlessness became much more important in the 
minds of Americans than understanding nations and nationhood in the aftermath of 
September 11th. This mentality lead to an intrinsic dependence on the common 
iconography of America. Because of this, states which defended and bound their 
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borders with both physical and symbolic nationalism were perceived as more resilient 
than those which did not.  When the territoriality of a state becomes more imperative 168
to its citizens than accepting multiculturalism, minority cultures suffer. A poignant 
example of this is a discussion of the nationalities of those inside the Twin Towers. 
While it is certainly positive in many ways to say that, ‘all were American citizens, 
regardless of ethnicity or race’, it can also lead to a misleading picture of the event. 
When patriotism revolves around a white, Christian narrative, saying ‘all were American’ 
contributes to the idea of white, Christian victimization. Because of this, it becomes 
difficult to imagine any other race or religion being a victim. This is a part of the reason 
why, when sadness finally gives way to anger, all Arabs and Muslims are attacked being 
unAmerican.  All these developments in the patriotic consciousness had lasting 169
repercussions on the nation, both in terms of creating a culture of white, Christian 
insularism, and in driving the actions of the nation both domestically and in foreign 
policy.
The immediate governmental and military reactions to September 11th were 
largely reflective of national attitudes. In the end, it was not Bush Sr. who was president 
when Vietnam Syndrome ended in the Arabian Desert, but rather, his son, when it 
ended in New York and Washington D.C. All of the emotional and intellectual arguments 
which had prevented the Presidents of the previous few decades from becoming 
embroiled abroad were forgotten, and patriotism became fashionable again. In this  post 
September 11th time a country previously weary of their government was calling for 
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vengeance and justice.  Congress reflected this sentiment when they gave George W. 170
Bush a ‘blank check’ in pursuit of doing so. More consequential than this, however, was 
that the American people were calling for intervention in South-Central Asia and the 
Middle East. Despite this, it should be said, some people were keeping a more level 
head and recalled that Afghanistan was a country which had defeated great powers 
before, just like Vietnam. However, this naysaying only provided fuel for Republicans 
who, when we became bogged down in the country in October, 2001, blamed the 
dissent.  In this way, Vietnam Syndrome was reinvigorated and politicians were again 171
claiming dissent to be unpatriotic. Given that the country is still embroiled in the area in 
2018, it seems that the patriotic sentiment from the Republicans prevailed.
It was not long at all after September 11th that America was at war in 
Afghanistan. Despite initial setbacks, the initial campaign was quite successful. Like the 
success of Operation Dessert Storm in 1991, the toppling of the Taliban was proof 
enough for Americans that war worked again. In this way, the dreaded Vietnam 
Syndrome seemed to be dead. In addition to this, the early stages of the war seemingly 
proved that ground warfare could be won with few American casualties. These early 
successes reinvigorated Americans and made them believe that the unmitigated 
quagmires of the past were over.  The fact that the government was able to convince 172
the people of this so early on led to further developments in the war on terror. Soon, the 
American public was completely agreeable to intervention against terrorist or terrorist 
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sponsoring states. Polls from 2002 show that people supported intervention in Iraq, Iran, 
and even against Islamic insurgents in the Philippines.  This was much hawkish than 173
the nonaggression of the late 1990s, and was mainly spurred on by a reinvigorated 
jingoistic patriotism. This also had effects on the American consciousness regarding its 
past.
The reason for, and consequence of, the aggressive patriotism was the same 
toxic revisionism which occurred under Reagan. Again, people looked back at 
quagmires such as Vietnam with rose tinted glasses. This revisionism claimed that it 
was not possible for the United States to be so bogged down when it had the support of 
all citizens.  This mentality had major consequences for American foreign policy, with 174
Bush believing that he could solve all of the issues in the Middle East which had been 
plaguing the free, democratic, and, whether he would admit it or not, Christian world. 
This was a step further than the Invasion of Afghanistan, which was at least given some 
reason by the Taliban harboring Bin Laden. After the Iraq war began, it was clear that 
the containment policy of the Cold War was gone, because in the new millennia, 
preemptive wars were the only way America could win. Essentially, Donald Rumsfeld 
and Dick Cheney likely more than the President himself, were dismantling the Powell 
Doctrine, ironically while Powell was Secretary of State.  In an effort to provide a final 175
closure to the Vietnam Syndrome, the Bush Administration made ousting Saddam 
Hussein the center of their foreign policy goals. Initially, it worked, with the fall of 
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Baghdad occurring only around a month after the start of the invasion. Akin the early 
successes in Afghanistan, the Invasion of Iraq showed to the American people that the 
country was strong again, and that military action was a viable first choice in foreign 
policy.  However, as the next decade and a half of war has proved, quagmires 176
comparable to Vietnam were still entirely possible. The revisionist based domestic 
actions were similarly harmful.
Many citizens expressed inclusive opinions towards Arab and Muslim Americans 
in the aftermath of September 11th, including good will from politicians. In late 
September, 2001, John McCain claimed that “Violence or discrimination against Arab 
and Muslim Americans is a betrayal of everything America stands for.”  However, the 177
actions of the United States government and the general response was much more 
negative and reflected  a desire for a return to normalcy. As stated, the national rhetoric 
response to the tragedy was one of increased patriotism, reflected in speeches of 
George Bush, the defense of the bombing of Afghanistan, and a rise in cultural comforts 
such as Norman Rockwell paintings.  However, this rise in American traditionalism 178
was not as much a rediscovery of conservatism as it was a “flag-shrouded anxiety”.  179
These types of cultural assurances were representative of the anxiety induced 
patriotism, which asserted that, while American values are timeless, they were in 
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trouble. In this way patriotism represented a return to normalcy.  The government 180
largely capitalized on this anxiety to assert the goals of the country, which made what 
would have once seemed like a domestic rejection of rights and justice much more 
palatable. 
The United States following September 11th was essentially an uncovered nerve; 
quick to react and extreme in its retaliation. The main example of this was the PATRIOT 
Act, which was announced under the guise of protecting American values. In actuality, 
the act was the first step aimed at limiting American civil liberties.  The first victims of 181
this, were Arab and Muslim Americans, who became much more limited in expressing 
political opinions, especially regarding Palestine. If they did, they could be accused of 
anti-Americanism and even anti-Semitism, and targeted.  However, the PATRIOT Act 182
and other actions of the United States government were mainly efforts to reenforce the 
strong border rhetoric, which stemmed from an idea of protecting American values.
The post September 11th era made the effort to strengthen American borders, 
and make sure enemies could not longer get in, essential. This mainly entailed 
enhanced border security, such as  with the PATRIOT Act, the Visa Entry Act and the 
tracking of foreign students. However, it also entailed reassessing the legitimately of 
foreign groups’ claims, and the necessity to be rid of them at any means necessary.  183
In seeking to protect American democracy, and humanity as a whole, the United States 
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was shrewdly denying the other’s claims to humanity.  In doing so, it set a dangerous 184
precedent. While claiming Al-Qaeda operatives and the hijackers are state actors (or 
even have humanity) is not exactly correct either, delegitimizing their operations to such 
an extent allows for any recourse, no matter how dangerous or inhumane in turn. This 
rhetoric is why dangerous carpet bombing operations can occur in Afghanistan, and why 
people can be held indefinitely without trial in Guantanamo Bay.  Patriotic ideals are 185
the main reason acts such as military tribunals for suspected terrorists on ships at sea 
could garner what The New York Times conceded was “broad public support”.  By 186
patriotically protecting American values, the government was able to justify many 
actions, including those which harmed civilians or were blatant human rights violations. 
Inside the United States as well, these ideas led to massive civil rights violations inside 
the United States. 
When the PATRIOT Act was enacted in late October, 2001, it dampened all hope 
of a healthy relationship with Arab and Muslim Americans. Like with many other groups, 
the act had broad support in the Arab American community, who also saw it as a viable 
way to protect the country. However, it soon became clear that the Act was a major 
violation of Constitutional rights brought about by fear and anxiety.  More than this, the 187
PATRIOT Act unjustly but unsurprisingly targeted Arab and Muslim Americans. With the 
description of all Al-Qaeda and Taliban Operatives as non-state actors, the United 
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States allowed for the creation of largely mythical ‘domestic terrorists’ who, acting as a 
fifth column, theoretically endeavored to disrupt America and undermined its values. It 
was because of this that, between 2001 and 2004 alone, over 1000 Arab men were 
detained by the FBI, with some held indefinitely, and others being quietly deported.  188
Despite acts such as the Oklahoma City Bombing being carried out in the name of new 
patriotism, these groups do not face targeting as often. The only discernible reasoning 
for this discrepancy that can be described is that the Islamic Terrorists arguably provide 
support for a foreign enemy. However, is there any real difference between the groups 
other than the fact that one’s goals are American and Christian based, and one’s is 
foreign and Islamic.  Both can do the same harm domestically, but only one is 189
targeted in such a way. Additionally, despite there being no justification for the murder of 
almost 3000 people, for the United States to deny any responsibility in creating either 
group through abandoning the Mujahideen after the Soviet-Afghan War and supporting 
Israel is foolish and detrimental to any effort to defeat them.  The encroachments 190
continue from here, growing from civil to human rights violations.
The well publicized actions in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib highlight some 
of the worst human rights violations against detainees, but they were by no means the 
only ones. In the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, it has been alleged that 
similar torture has occurred. On April 3th, 2002, The New York Times reported that 
“dozens of Muslim men have been held in virtual secrecy after their arrests,” and that 
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they “Civil Rights groups have complained that many detainees were not allowed to 
contact family members or lawyers after their arrests and that their haven been held 
under especially harsh conditions for people charged only with minor immigration 
violations.”  Additionally, in the same article, it was reported that a judge had to 191
intervene to assure the trials were open to the public, showing clear intentions of other 
authorities to clandestinely violate the rights of prisoners through acts such as private 
trials. Further, in this time, while some police refused to comply, as many as 18,000 men 
were brought in for questioning across the United States, with the definition of 
criminality expanding heavily.  Additionally, because of this new lax definition of 192
justice, search and seizures were becoming commonplace, where homes could be 
entered and possessions searched.  With the FBI monitoring small businesses and all 193
of the rights violations mentioned above, by 2002, Arab and Muslim Americans began to 
realize that they were being targeted indiscriminately by these acts. The main question 
to be asked of this is; How should America respond with these issues of 
marginalization? Essentially, it is a question of scholarship on the issues, specifically by 
Arab-Americans.
Only just prior to September 11th, scholarship on Arab and Muslim Americans 
was finally emerging. However, after, they were shot from the periphery of society to the 
very center. Because of this, it became more important for Arabs and Muslims to 
integrate into American society and history (not necessarily assimilate, but cultivate their 
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own hyphenated American identity), but was simultaneously more difficult to do so. In 
essence, it was vital for Arab and Muslim Americans to form a political identity, but could 
not for risk of being labeled unpatriotic.  Because of this, it is vital that more Arab and 194
Muslim scholarship emerge, especially by Arab and Muslim Americans, and that it be 
more accepted. This serves the dual purpose of furthering knowledge on these 
important Americans, while also helping them become more accepted in the country. 
This will only come when Americans accept the dissent against the actions of the 
country. However, there are very challenging issues in this regard.
Unlike any other groups in the United States following September 11th, Arab and 
Muslim Americans were forced to think about their cultural allegiances. This was not 
because Arabs and Muslims were in any way against America, only that they were now 
on the periphery of society and had to decide whether they wanted to remain culturally 
distinct. The reason these groups of people were forced to tread lightly was that an 
“imperative patriotism” was dictating that all dissent was unpatriotic.  The impression 195
of conformity was meant to generally aid the legitimacy of national efforts abroad and 
domestically. Essentially, the question of the day was, ‘Are you with America and God, 
or your own religion and culture?’. Along with being inherently xenophobic, this question 
is specifically Islamophobic. In declaring a divine interest in American interests, 
patriotism took on the traditional American values of Christianity.  Essentially, in using 196
this question to quell any dissent, the United States essentially had the ability to claim 
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Christian civilization as a right to fix problems overseas without any general protest 
domestically. In this way, it was an ‘imperative patriotism’, as it became essential that 
racism be used to further goals abroad.  In the time following September 11th, 197
Imperative patriotism further proved to be inherently connected to xenophobia.
In saying, ‘If you do not like it’, leave, imperative Patriotism directly lends itself to 
xenophobia. The reason it is, is that assumes the United States has a largely fixed 
identity, and any dissent, culturally, religiously, politically, or otherwise, forfeits one’s 
claim to that identity. This only increased after September 11th, where the United 
States, emerged as having one way of life, which was iconographically patriotic, white, 
christian, and apolitical.  However, a lack of addressing previous issues leads to 198
further xenophobic rhetoric. For example, the lack of white American addressing of 
slavery has had a direct impact on racism in the modern United States. The same goes 
for September 11th and Arab and Muslim Americans. In never truly addressing its 
issues with orientalism prior to 2001, America set itself up for xenophobia. Additionally, 
in not addressing the various issues with patriotism, America ignores the toxic 
expressions of racism which come from using it as an excuse.  This does not go for 199
Arab and Muslim Americas alone, either, as the recent NFL protests have shown that 
the increasingly divisive patriotism has led to increasingly divided race relations. 
For patriotism to regain any semblance of usefulness or positivity, it must 
reemerge as it existed prior to September 11th, but after the administration of George 
 Salaita, “Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism,” in College Literature, 155.197
 Salaita, “Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism,” in College Literature, 156.198
 Salaita, “Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism,” in College Literature, 158.199
 76
H.W. Bush. Historically, in the 21st century, Patriotism has had a direct role in informing 
islamophobia in the United States. In the immediate aftermath of September 11th, the 
American people, as a result of trying to understand what had happened, were very 
divisive in their reactions to the tragedy. However, quickly, a binary system of good and 
evil quickly emerged, where ethnic identity and patriotism became an important deciding 
factor. This, plus the idea of terrorists as illegitimate humans or state actors, meant that 
these distinct cultures tended to be regarded as illegitimate as well. The governmental 
response to September 11th was equally harmful. In using patriotic rhetoric to assert the 
goals of the state and further justify its actions, acts such as the PATRIOT Act and the 
undoubtably superfluous and damaging Iraq War can occur. Patriotism can be a positive 
aspect of American culture, notably when its an all including, iconoclastic, willing to 
address its own faults, and healing. Essentially, if patriotism is aimed at upholding the 
ideals of justice, as with ‘civic nationalism’, it can be a positive. However, the aftermath 
of September 11th has proven it to be a largely symbolic and even toxic ideal which 
leads itself, whether directly or indirectly, consciously or subconsciously, to both 
xenophobic and repressive rhetorics. 
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